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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents the main features of the macroeconomic model being used at The Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College, which has proven to be a useful tool in tracking the 
current financial and economic crisis. We investigate the connections of the model to the 
“New Cambridge” approach, and discuss other recent approaches to the evolution of 
financial balances for all sectors of the economy. We will finally show the effects of fiscal 
policy in the model, and its implications for the proposed fiscal stimulus on the U.S. 
economy. We show that the New Cambridge hypothesis, which claimed that the private 
sector financial balance would be stable relative to income in the short run, does not hold for 
the short term in our model, but it does hold for the medium/long term. This implies that the 
major impact of the fiscal stimulus in the long run will be on the external imbalance, unless 
other measures are taken. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last ten years,
1 the macroeconomic team at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard 
College—led by Wynne Godley—has been warning about the unsustainability of the growth 
path in the U.S. economy, characterized by the accumulation of large and growing debts. 
The recession in 2001 was, in our view, a first sign of trouble in this unbalanced growth 
pattern, but a serious recession was avoided at the time by fiscal and monetary intervention, 
only to postpone the problem and make it more serious. We have again been warning about 
the possibility of a recession,
2 which eventually materialized along the lines we projected in 
Godley et al. (2007). 
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1 The first analysis is in Godley (1999). 
2 See Papadimitriou, Zezza, and Hannsgen (2006) and Godley et al. (2007), among others.   3
In figure 1, we compare our projection for real GDP growth, published in Godley et 
al. (2007) with the actual evolution in GDP, where the vertical line corresponds to the 
information available at the time of the projection.
3 The chart shows that our model has a 
good tracking record. At the time we were expecting a moderate recession, although we have 
become much more pessimistic as new data on financial markets has later become 
available.
4 
Our work is centered around a macroeconometric model that has thus proven to be 
quite reliable in tracking the U.S. economy over the medium term. Moreover, the approach 
we adopt for summarizing our results is based on the projection of the financial balances of 
the private, public, and foreign sectors. Although our approach was quite unconventional, 
especially since most models discuss households and business separately, it has attracted 
some attention and has been increasingly adopted or imitated.
5 However, we believe that the 
use of financial imbalances is sometimes framed in a misleading way, or is grounded in a 
completely different theoretical approach, so we believe it may be useful to shed some light 
on our own view on how the dynamics of financial balances can be of guidance to the 
medium-term prospects of an economy and what is the relation of fiscal policy to such 
imbalances—and to economic growth—in our framework. 
In the next section we will briefly summarize our interpretation of U.S. growth in the 
last fifteen years and the origins of the current crisis. We will then present in section 3 the 
main features of the Levy macroeconometric model and then discuss alternative approaches 
to financial balances in section 4. A discussion of the impact of fiscal policy in section 5 will 
conclude. 
 
2. OUR VIEW OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 
In our view, the current financial and economic crisis is not the consequence of malpractices 
in some sectors of the financial industry or a result of policy failure—although both certainly 
played a role—but rather the inevitable consequence of an unbalanced growth process that 
                                                 
3 Discrepancies between our projection and history before 2007 are due to revisions to U.S. national accounts. 
4 Our latest report is Godley, Papadimitriou, and Zezza (2008). See also Papadimitriou (2009). 
5 See Wolf (2008a and 2008b). The financial balances approach has been adopted by Goldman Sachs for short-
term projection; see Hatzius (2003 and 2006), among others. Other approaches to financial balances will be 
discussed in section 4.   4
started at the end of the 1980s.
6 Godley’s first Strategic Analysis report pointed to seven 
unsustainable processes: 
 
“(1) the fall in private saving into ever deeper negative 
territory, (2) the rise in the flow of net lending to the 
private sector, (3) the rise in the growth rate of the real 
money stock, (4) the rise in asset prices at a rate that far 
exceeds the growth of profits (or of GDP), (5) the rise in 
the budget surplus, (6) the rise in the current account 
deficit, (7) the increase in the United States’ net foreign 
indebtedness relative to GDP.” (Godley 1999: 2) 
 
Some of these processes—excluding monetary policy (3) and budget policy (5)—
characterized both the so-called “New Economy” growth period, which ended with the 2001 
recession (Godley and Izurieta 2002), and the next growth period characterized by a housing 
bubble, which ended in 2007. Private sector debt has been rising steadily as a share of GDP 
(figure 2), with household debt accelerating in the 2000s, reversing its course only in the first 
quarter of 2008 with the start of the current financial crisis. 
 
                                                 
6 The saving rate of the personal sector started to decline around 1985. In the same period the distribution of 
income started to shift systematically in favor of the richest quintile of the population. For a theoretical model 
of the relation among the saving rate, borrowing, and the distribution of income, see Zezza (2008).   5
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The strong increase in domestic demand (financed by credit) was the main source of 
U.S. growth in the 2000s, resulting in a widening deficit in the current account balance, 
which, in turn, cumulated into a growing external debt. In figure 3 we report the net asset 
position of the United States, relative to GDP, along with an implicit measure of U.S. debt 
obtained by cumulating the current account balance through time, starting from a benchmark 
value. This latter figure will not depend on fluctuations of either assets market values or the 
exchange rate, and the figure clearly shows the very specific feature of the U.S. economy: a 
depreciation of the exchange rate—similar to the one that began in 2002—has little effect on 
U.S. liabilities, which are mainly in U.S. dollars, but increases the market value of U.S. 
assets abroad (which are mainly in euro, yen, and other strong currencies), resulting in an 
improvement in the net asset position, even against a large and growing current account 
deficit. 
   6
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In figure 4 we report two simple measures of relative growth in asset prices, obtained 
by subtracting the annual growth rate in nominal GDP from the growth rate in a stock 
market index and in a price index for the housing market. The picture in figure 4 shows 
clearly how the stock market bubble played a major role in the “New Economy” period 
between 1995 and 2000, and how the housing market bubble started immediately after, with 
both price indexes now decreasing. 
   7
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The charts in fivgures 2–4 show that five of the unsustainable processes outlined in 
Godley (1999) were still at work in the 2000s, after the 2001 recession and the end of the 
“New Economy.” On the other hand, budget and monetary policy changed their course. In 
figure 5 we report three measures of the monetary policy stance, namely the federal fund rate 
and the growth rate in M1 and M2. We subtract the inflation rate to obtain a measure of the 
ex post interest rate and measures of the growth in the money stock net of inflation. The 
chart in figure 5 confirms that the stock of M2 was growing rapidly in the second half of the 
1990s, although the real interest rate was not low. With the 2001 recession, interest rates 
were reduced in real terms and they were gradually raised again in 2004, when the price of 
oil increased and inflation seemed to become a threat again. 
   8
Figure 5. Monetary Policy 
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Some commentators argue that the reason for the current crisis is based on the easing 
of monetary policy: 
 
“The classic explanation of financial crises is that they 
are caused by excesses—frequently monetary excesses—
which lead to a boom and an inevitable bust. This crisis 
was no different: A housing boom followed by a bust led 
to defaults, the implosion of mortgages and mortgage-
related securities at financial institutions, and resulting 
financial turmoil. Monetary excesses were the main 
cause of the boom. The Fed held its target interest rate, 
especially in 2003–2005, well below known monetary 
guidelines that say what good policy should be based on 
historical experience. Keeping interest rates on the track 
that worked well in the past two decades, rather than 
keeping rates so low, would have prevented the boom 
and the bust.” (J.B. Taylor 2009) 
 
 
This explanation, however, does not take into account that household (and foreign) 
debt had started to rise well before the monetary easing. The decline in mortgage rates 
allowed the private sector to increase their debt while keeping interest payments constant as   9
a share of income,
7 and therefore postponed a more severe recession and fueled a boom. If 
interest rates had been kept at higher levels, the short growth recession of 2001 would have 
lasted longer and would have had more serious consequences on unemployment and output. 
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Fiscal policy was also used to contrast the drop in domestic demand in the 2001 
recession. As figure 6 shows, the federal budget turned from a surplus into a deficit and 
helped the economy recover. One of the problems with the current recession is thus that 
fiscal policy is required at a time when the government is already running a deficit. We will 
come back to fiscal policy in the first section of the paper. 
Summing up, the long period of sustained growth in the United States was fueled, in 
our view, by “excessive” private domestic expenditure, with a major role played by 
households expenditure in the 2000s, financed by increasing injections of credit. The 
mainstream view—before the crisis burst—was that growth in domestic expenditure was not 
                                                 
7 See Shaikh et al. (2003) for our early analysis of household debt and the interest payments burden.   10
excessive, but rather due to rational expectations on future income growth. Our view
8 is that 
excessive consumption was—at least in part—determined by two joint factors: a shift in the 
distribution of income towards the richest quintile and the struggle of the median household 
to keep its relative standard of living against the richest quintile. 
In the following we will not explore this issue further, but we will investigate the 
mechanics linking borrowing and expenditure to growth and financial balances in our model. 
 
3. THE LEVY MODEL 
 
The Levy macroeconometric model was originally built in the 1990s with annual data and 
developed over the years, adopting quarterly data and with substantial revisions in the 
econometric methodology, although we may say that the key properties of the model have 
been preserved in all subsequent releases. The private sector is modeled as a whole, with no 
distinction between household and business.
9 The model accounting structure can thus be 
laid down—at the current stage—with no explicit representation of the financial sector or, 
better, assuming that the financial sector accommodates any demand for credit, accepts any 
supply of deposits, and transfers all of its profits to the nonfinancial sector. 
Adopting the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) approach pioneered by Richard 
Stone, model accounting can be represented as in table 1, where monetary payments are 
recorded in the columns and receipts in the rows. There is no explicit treatment of physical 











                                                 
8 See Zezza (2007 and 2008). The relevance of relative consumption, or the “keep up with the Joneses” effect, 
seems to be gaining ground. See Cynamon and Fazzari (2008), Stiglitz (2008), and Akerlof (2007) for a 
somewhat different perspective. 
9 This is consistent with the “New Cambridge” approach we will discuss later.   11
Table 1. Social Accounting Matrix for the Levy Model 
   Production Private 
Sector  Government Rest of the 
World 
Capital 
Account  Total 
1. Production    Private 
expenditure 
Government 
expenditure  Exports   Aggregate 
demand 
2. Private Sector 
Wages & 
profits    Gov’t. transfers 
to private s. 
Net income 






and s.c.       Gov’t. 
receipts 
4. Rest of the World  Imports 






   Payments 
to RoW 
5. Capital Account    Net acq. of 





income  Gov’t. outlays Receipts 
from RoW  0  
 
 
The SAM has the property that the value of each row is equal to the value of the 
corresponding column. For the first row and column, the identity is between the value of 
aggregate demand (including the ex post change in inventories) and the value of production. 
For the other rows and columns, the identity is defining saving (in the “Capital Account” 
row) as the difference between income (the row total) less expenditure (including capital 
expenditure) and transfers. Accounting consistency requires that, when demand equals 
supply, the sum of saving for all sectors (i.e., our financial balances) be zero, i.e., 
 
        NAFA - GD - BP = 0         (1) 
 
where NAFA is the net acquisition of financial assets by the private sector, GD is 
government deficit, and BP the current account in the balance of payments. 
The model is developed along the lines of stock-flow consistent models.
10 The stock 
of net financial assets of each sector increases with net saving,
11 and stocks feed back into 
flows through interest payments or whenever flows adjust towards a stock-flow norm. 
The crucial equation in the model relates private expenditure to disposable income 
and net financial assets of the private sector, all measured in real terms, that is, 
 
                                                 
10 See Godley and Lavoie (2006) for an extensive treatment. 
11 In its current stage the model does not detail the accounting of capital gains on domestic assets, while the 
accounting for capital gains on U.S. assets abroad is well developed. Capital gains effects on expenditure are 
captured through price variables.   12
    DE  =  f(YD,  FA,  Z)      (2) 
 
where DE is private expenditure, FA the opening stock of net financial assets, and Z a vector 
of other variables. Assuming a linear relationship, and abstracting from Z and capital gains, 
since net assets accumulation is given by: 
 
        FA = FA(-1) + YD – DE        (3) 
 
in steady state, when FA = FA(-1) and therefore DE = YD, equation (2) can be solved to 
yield a stable ratio between income (YD) and net financial assets (FA). This was one of the 
ideas underlying the “New Cambridge Hypothesis,” which assumed in addition that the 
private sector would adjust rather quickly to a shock to restore its desired income/assets 
ratio. 
Although Godley usually derived his results from a steady-state assumption, 
assuming steady growth—which is more reasonable—would not change our results. In 
steady growth, 
 
    FA  =  (1+g)·FA(-1)      (4) 
 
where g is the (steady) growth rate in assets. Using (4) in (3) and assuming a linear relation 
among DE, YD, and FA, that is, 
 















      ( 6 )  
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and disposable income is stable with respect to the opening stock of financial assets, for 
stable parameter values. Note also that (6) implies that income and assets grow at the same 
rate. 
In the current model,
12 the income/asset ratio of the private sector is affected by 
capital gains on homes and equities, as well as borrowing. Namely, an increase in either the 
real price of equities or the real price of homes will increase expenditure over income (and 
wealth). Again, the ability to borrow for both households and corporations generates an 
increase in expenditure over income. 
We were careful to test for possible misspecifications. In particular, borrowing and 
income may depend on expenditure, so we tested for weak exogeneity, as well as for 
structural breaks, and the equation has passed these tests, as well as the standard battery of 
specification tests. 
The rest of the Levy model is more conventional, following the Keynesian and Post 
Keynesian tradition. Trade depends on income and relative prices, trade prices react to the 
exchange rate, as well as domestic and foreign prices, etc. Some variables, notably inflation, 
are not modeled in detail yet. 
 
4. FINANCIAL BALANCES 
 
To properly identify a definition of financial balances that is coherent with national 
accounting, we may start from the GDP identity: 
 
        GDP = C + I + G + B         (7) 
 
where B is the balance of trade, C is consumption, G is government expenditure, and I is 
gross investment including the change in inventories. Adding or subtracting net transfers 
from sector i to sector j, Tij, and considering the household sector H, business sector B, 
government sector G, and foreign sector W, we get: 
 
GDP - Thg - Tbg + Twh + Twb = C + I + (G- Thg - Tbg + Tgw) + (B + Twh + Twb - Tgw)   
           ( 8 )  
                                                 
12 See the appendix for a technical discussion of our equation.   14
If transfers from households and business to the government include taxes, we can 
further split GDP into personal income, Yh, and business gross profits, Yb. With this 
simplification, the first bracket in our equation is equal to government deficit:  
 
        GD = G - Thg - Tbg + Tgw        (9) 
 
and the second bracket is equal to the balance of payments on current account BP: 
 
BP = B + Twh + Twb – Tgw       (10) 
 
we can thus rewrite (5) as: 
 
  (Yh + Tbh + Twh - Thg) + (Yb - Tbg - Tbh) = C + I + GD + BP    (11) 
 
where Yb includes any net transfers to business from the rest of the world, and we added and 
subtracted transfers from business to households, Tbh, which will mainly be dividends. 
The first term in brackets defines personal disposable income, YDh: 
 
        YDh = Yh + Tbh + Twh – Thg      (12) 
 
while the second term in bracket in equation (8) defines undistributed profits, Π: 
 
    Π  = Yb - Tbg – Tbh          (13) 
 
We can now split gross investment into residential investment, Ir, nonresidential 
investment, Ik, and change in inventories, In. Rearranging equation (11) and using (12) and 
(13) we get: 
 
        (YDh - C - Ir) + (Π - Ik - In) = GD + BP    (14)   15
or, defining personal saving, Sh, as: 
 
    S h   =   Y D h   –   C        ( 1 5 )  
 
        (Sh - Ir) + (Π - Ik - In) = GD + BP      (16) 
 
where the two terms on the left-hand side measure the excess of saving over capital 
expenditure for the household and business sector, respectively, which are therefore the net 
acquisition of financial assets (NAFA) by such sectors: 
 
        NAFAh + NAFAb = GD + BP      (17) 
 
Another way to look at equation (11) is given by: 
 
        (Ir - Sh) + (Ik + In - Π) + GD + BP = 0    (18) 
 
where now each term represents the excess of expenditure over income, with BP being the 
excess of expenditure in the United States of the foreign sector against income from the 
United States of the foreign sector. 
Financial balances in (18) are derived from income accounting and have a 
counterpart in the flow of funds. Defining the change in the stock of financial assets as dFA 
and the change in financial liabilities as dFL for any sector it must be the case that: 
 




        S + dFL = I + dFA          (20) 
   16
where (20) has the sources of funds on the left-hand side—saving plus borrowing—and the 
uses of funds on the right-hand side—investment in physical capital plus acquisition of 
financial assets. 
It is interesting to look at the historical performance for the United States of all 
variables in equation (18). Starting from the personal sector, figure 7 reports saving, 
residential investment, and the net change in mortgages. 
 












1952 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006
Saving
Residential investment
Net increase in mortgages
Sources: B.E.A. and the Federal Reserve
% of Personal Disposable 
 
 
Some stylized facts emerge from figure 7: 1) the saving rate for the personal sector 
has declined steadily from 1985; 2) as saving declines, the share of residential investment 
financed by borrowing has increased; 3) in 2000s, the value of new mortgages had exceeded 
the value of residential investment; 4) the magnitude of the drop in borrowing in the current 
crisis is unprecedented. 
Before the housing bubble burst, several commentators argued that the increase in 
home prices was not a “bubble,” but rather the consequence of market mechanisms that were 
reducing credit rationing, allowing more households to allocate their expenditure optimally,   17
and the rise in the relative price of homes was thus the consequence of a process of efficient 
allocation of resources. The fact that the change in mortgages exceeded residential 
investment shows instead the characteristic features of a speculative bubble, where 
speculators borrow to buy assets against self-fulfilling expectations of increases in asset 
prices—that is, until expectations are reversed.
13 
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In figure 8 we report a comparable picture for the nonfinancial corporate sector. 
Profits cover a substantial portion of investment,
14 with the remaining funds acquired 
through borrowing. It is interesting to note that in the last five years or so the increase in 
business borrowing was not matched by an increase in investment: this is one part of the 
“financialization” process, where firms borrowed to invest in financial assets—to buy back 
their own equities or get equity shares in other businesses. 
 
 
                                                 
13 See Shaikh et al. (2003: 6) for our early warnings about problems in the housing market. 
14 In our recent econometric estimates for model development, undistributed profits are a key determinant of 
business investment.   18
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The graph in figure 9 reports the financial balance for the private sector as a whole, 
together with the financial balances of the other two sectors of the economy. Balances 
behavior seems to differ from an initial period, characterized by a moderate, stable surplus in 
the current account balance and a surplus in government budget. We can read the balances as 
net contributions to aggregate demand, implying that in the 1950s and 1960s, demand was 
mainly driven by net exports and investment. In the next period, the government budget 
turned into a deficit, the private sector went into surplus, and the current account balance 
started to deteriorate: fiscal policy was a net contributor to aggregate demand. In the 1990s, 
the private expenditure increased again relative to income and the current account balance 
worsened. As we have seen, fiscal policy partly offset the rise in domestic demand up to the 
2001 recession and then turned expansionary to counter the drop in domestic demand. 
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The analysis of financial balances in figure 9 can be developed along three different lines. 
 
1.  First of all, as we have discussed, a positive balance implies that, for that sector, 
injections exceed leakages, so that that sector is a net contributor to aggregate demand. 
Since the sum of all balances is always zero, GDP growth can be compatible with any 
combination of financial balances. 
 
2.  Movements in the balances signal an increase (decrease) of injections against leakages. If 
any of the sectors changes its balance, this will have consequences on the growth rate, as 
well as being reflected on other balances. For instance, an improvement in the foreign 
balance—generated, say, by a devaluation—will increase GDP, reduce government 
deficit, and increase saving against investment. An increase in private expenditure over 
income will also increase GDP and reduce government deficit, but will make the current 
account balance worse. Analysis of movements in the balances can thus help 
understanding the trajectory of the economy. 
 
3.  Financial balances imply an accumulation of net financial assets. Whenever a balance is 
in negative territory, it can thus be interpreted as the net increase in debt, which may be 
unsustainable above a given threshold. 
 
A first approach to the levels and the dynamics of balances is linked with “New 
Cambridge.” In the 1970s, Godley and associates
15 adopted the balances approach as the 
basis for a model of the UK economy. As we noted, the approach was unconventional, since 
it merged households and business, analyzing the private sector as a whole. 
The “New Cambridge Hypothesis” was that NAFA—the net acquisition of financial 
balances for the private sector as whole—was stable, relative to GDP, and any shock to this 
stable assets/income ratio would be corrected rather quickly. 
The implication of this hypothesis was a “twin deficits” result, i.e., any imbalance in 
the foreign account was matched by an imbalance in the government account. In the face of 
a crisis that called for expansionary fiscal policy on Keynesian lines, it was thus necessary to 
adopt measures to counter the implied widening of the current account imbalance. Such 
measures could be exchange rate devaluation or protectionism. 
                                                 
15 See Cripps and Godley (1976). See Mata (2006) for a nice reconstruction of the debate on the “New 
Cambridge Hypothesis” at the time.   20
The “New Cambridge Hypothesis” was grounded in empirical results, which did not 
hold in the following years, so that the approach was progressively abandoned and basically 
neglected until Godley’s work at The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College started to 
gain ground for its merits in providing a consistent explanation of the evolution of the U.S. 
economy. 
At least two research groups have been investigating the economics of financial 
balances, grounding their work on Godley’s approach. 
Hatzius, at Goldman Sachs, has modeled financial balances through an error 
correction approach towards a long-run equilibrium, which is determined by financial 
variables. In his approach, the private sector balance depends on an indicator for the equity 
market, an indicator for the housing market, and an indicator for the corporate credit spread 
(Hatzius 2005: 12).
16 He claims that his model has good short-run forecasting properties, as 
movements of balances away from equilibrium seem to be leading indicators for the business 
cycle.  
Taylor and associates
17 have also been investigating financial balances, without 
developing a full model, but analyzing the relation of each balance to the business cycle and 
against each other. Their results are quite relevant to the current debate, which sometimes 
uses financial balances to address the effects of fiscal policy. For instance, Fama uses the 
identity connecting financial balances to claim that “[t]he added (government) debt absorbs 
savings that would otherwise go to private investment” (Fama 2009). The idea that any 
increase in government deficit implies a change in the opposite direction for the private 
sector balance is identified in DeLong (2009) with the “Treasury view” that Keynes 
opposed. This idea has been proposed again in a more sophisticated form through the 
Ricardian equivalence, which claims that any increase in government deficit will be 
discounted by the private sector, generating complete crowding out. 
Barbosa-Filho et al. (2006)—among others—show that the Ricardian equivalence 
approach has no empirical ground, although its proponents still use it
18 to claim that fiscal 
policy will not be effective for boosting aggregate demand, even in periods of rising 
unemployment. 
                                                 
16 Hatzius (2003) has a model where the household and corporate financial balances are treated separately, with 
the same methodology. 
17 See Barbosa-Filho et al. (2006 and 2007). See also Taylor (2004). 
18 See Barro (2009) and J.B. Taylor (2009).   21
  We finally want to discuss the relation of financial deficits to the corresponding stock 
of net liabilities. Abstracting from capital gains, the dynamics of debt, D, is increased by a 
deficit, DEF, according to: 
 
     t t t DEF D D + = −1       ( 2 1 )  
 
Dividing through by GDP, and using lower-case letters to denote variables as a share of 





− = − t t t t d
g
g
def d d     (22) 
 






> t t d
g
g
def       ( 2 3 )  
 
which gives a useful expression to evaluate the sustainability of financial balances and, 
therefore, of growth trajectories. For instance, if the stock of debt is 100 percent of GDP, any 
deficit above the GDP growth rate will result in ever-increasing debt/GDP, which will 
eventually trigger a crisis. 
Inspection of financial balances is therefore useful to quickly evaluate whether a 
deficit is getting to “excessive” levels and the underlying stock of debt may become 
unsustainable. 
But when is debt unsustainable?
19 A rise in debt implies an increase in the risk of 
default and larger interest payments as a share of income. The public sector should be better 
equipped to cope with this, especially when the central bank is willing to finance any new 
debt that is not absorbed in the market. 
                                                 
19 A more sophisticated analysis of debt sustainability can be developed taking interest rates into account, and 
standard specifications usually show that debt will rise as a share of output whenever the interest rate is larger 
than the growth rate, with a primary deficit equal to zero. We do not follow these lines since we are interested 
here in directly comparing financial balances to debt accumulation.   22
For similar reasons, the United States is able to finance a growing external debt, as 
long as the world is willing to accept U.S. dollars as a reserve currency. Private sector debt is 
more prone to trigger a crisis and we therefore believe it is better—in the current crisis—to 
substitute private debt with public debt through fiscal expansion. 
 
5. FISCAL POLICY IN THE LEVY MODEL 
 
Our latest exercise in estimating the effects of fiscal policy with the Levy model has been 
recently presented in Godley, Papadimitriou, and Zezza (2008) and Papadimitriou (2009). 
We are interested here in the effects of an increase in fiscal deficit over the other financial 
balances. In our exercise, we explore the effects of two shocks to government outlays—both 
expenditure and transfers—where the second shock is twice the first, and compare our 
results with a baseline projection.
20 
Results for the impact on balances—compared to the baseline—are reported in figure 
10. We note that in the long run the private sector balance tends to revert to its baseline 
value, so that a shock to government deficit has an impact on foreign deficit of almost equal 
proportions. 
 
                                                 
20 The magnitude of the smaller shock, and its composition, are loosely based on the Obama plan circulating in 
January 2009, see Romer and Bernstein (2009).   23































1st shock: solid lines
2nd shock: dashed lines
 
Our model therefore respects the “New Cambridge Hypothesis,” but only in the 
medium term. Any fiscal expansion will result in a wider external deficit, therefore fiscal 
policy in the United States alone will not solve, but may worsen, the problem of global 
financial imbalances. Coordinated international efforts are required for fiscal expansion in 




This paper has explored the main properties of the Levy macroeconomic model for the 
United States, which has proven to be a useful tool to track the evolution of the U.S. 
economy in the medium term. 
We have shown the relation of the model to the “New Cambridge” school and 
discussed the implications for the analysis of the financial balances of the private, 
government, and foreign sectors. We have briefly presented our interpretation of the 
evolution of the U.S. economy in the last 15 years, claiming that it has been driven by 
domestic demand financed by borrowing, thus generating a rising debt-to-income ratio for 
the private sector, which would sooner or later trigger a crisis.   24
Finally, we have discussed how financial balances can be used to assess the role of 
fiscal policy. Our empirical results show that government expenditure can and should play a 
role in sustaining aggregate demand when either the private or the foreign sectors are 
shrinking. In our approach, however, fiscal policy will generate larger external deficits in the 
medium term, which should be countered through additional policy intervention. 
Our current line of research aims at developing a more disaggregated model, where 
households and nonfinancial businesses are tackled separately to verify if results obtained 
modeling the private sector as a whole still hold. 
   25
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APPENDIX. The Econometrics of Private Expenditure 
 
One among the possible linearizations of our private expenditure equation is the following, 
estimated with Eviews vers.6: 
 
Dependent Variable: D(PE)     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 22/02/09   Time: 19:58     
Sample (adjusted): 1970:3 2007:4   
Included observations: 150 after adjustments   
Variable  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
PE(-1) -0.342899 0.037269 -9.200641 0.0000 
YD(-1) 0.273551 0.033706 8.115865 0.0000 
FA(-1)  0.042468 0.007146 5.942782 0.0000 
PFA(-1)  3.076543 0.386320 7.963711 0.0000 
PH (-1)  3.082319 0.879336 3.505282 0.0006 
DBH(-1)  0.197673 0.028628 6.904996 0.0000 
DBB(-1)  0.111728 0.020148 5.545388 0.0000 
D(PE(-1))  0.202948 0.058231 3.485207 0.0007 
D(YD)  0.421597 0.043817 9.621739 0.0000 
D(DBH)  0.165243 0.027161 6.083927 0.0000 
D(DBB)  0.081859 0.024156 3.388801 0.0009 
C  -186.2441 37.48880 -4.967993 0.0000 
R-squared  0.725933    Mean dependent var  48.02400 
Adjusted R-squared  0.704087    S.D. dependent var  49.80985 
S.E. of regression  27.09549    Akaike info criterion  9.513230 
Sum squared resid  101314.8    Schwarz criterion  9.754081 
Log likelihood  -701.4922    Hannan-Quinn criter.  9.611080 
F-statistic  33.22974    Durbin-Watson stat  1.974629 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000      
 
Where: 
•  PE = private expenditure at chained 2000 prices; 
•  YD = private disposable income at chained 2000 prices; 
•  FA = the opening stock of financial assets, deflated by the PE deflator. The stock of 
financial assets is the sum of government debt (obtained cumulating government 
deficits from a benchmark value) and foreign net assets (obtained cumulating the 
current account balance from a benchmark value); 
•  PFA = S&P 500 index, deflated by the PE deflator; 
•  PH = the Realtor.org index for the median price of existing single-family homes, 
deflated by the PE deflator; 
•  DBH = the change in household debt outstanding, deflated by the PE deflator; 
•  DBB = the change in business debt outstanding, deflated by the PE deflator. 
 
The equation implies the following long-rung relation: 
PE = 0.798·YD + 0.124·FA + 8.972·PFA + 8.989·PH + 0.576·DBH + 0.326·DBB 
    (0.027)    (0.023)    (0.585)     (2.638)    (0.070)     (0.045) 
where numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.   29
Although our long-run relation cannot be identified as a cointegrating vector with the 
Johansen approach, it passes the cointegrating test in the ARDL approach (Pesaran, Shin, 
and Smith 2001). 
We checked the equation for weak exogeneity of income and borrowing, using as 
instruments for income: the lagged value of income; the lagged value of GDP growth in U.S. 
trading partners; the lagged value of the federal fund rate; the lagged value of the indirect tax 
rate, government expenditure, and transfers; and the lagged value of foreign inflation. 
Instruments for both borrowing variables were their lagged values. Our equations pass the 
test for weak regressors and the Wu-Hausman test for exogeneity confirms that all variables 
can be treated as weakly exogenous. 
 
 
 